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It is an honor to appear before this Association which represents so many of those engaged in law enforcement in the free world.

If I were asked to point out the most obvious difference between the free world and the communist dominated areas it would be this. The free world provides for law enforcement that protects the right and liberties of the individual. Here the police authority represents the very essence of democracy in action. Law enforcement in the communist world looks first and foremost to safeguarding the ruling regime without regard for individual rights. Here the police authority becomes the shield of entrenched autocratic authority.

It is fortunate that over the years steady progress has been made in improving our techniques of law enforcement and in building up cooperation between the various jurisdictions of police authorities on both a national and international scale. For since 1917 and increasingly during the past decade the problem of maintaining domestic law and order has had to face a new and unprecedented danger -- world-wide communist activity.

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What we often refer to as organized crime on the domestic front certainly presents you with plenty of problems. But there is a sharp difference between the resources and capabilities of the private criminal, whether acting singly or in organized groups, ~~and the international~~ conspiracy of communism, with its headquarters in Moscow, an affiliated organization in Peiping, and branch offices in Warsaw, Prague and many other centers.

Such a world-wide conspiracy as this fosters no ordinary breed of criminal. It is engaged in no ordinary type of law breaking. Its members are carefully trained, operate with great skill and with the backing of a far flung and efficient organization. Its work is often hard to detect, partly because the motives which influence the ordinary criminal are lacking. Here the real motive is the weakening of the fabric of non-communist states in time of peace in order that it may be vulnerable to the long-range designs of the communist movement. The success so far achieved, here and in many other countries, in controlling this conspiracy is a fine tribute to the efficiency of the police organizations of the free world.

The Soviets keep as a closely guarded secret the number of their own citizens and of foreign indigenous agents who are trained in the USSR, in China, and in the Satellites for subversion and espionage. Certainly there are many tens of thousands. As the students graduate, they flow into the Communist apparatus throughout the world. You have undoubtedly met some of these alumni, and if not, you certainly will.

Some high members of the MVD have revolted against the methods they have been taught to practice, and have come over voluntarily -- "defected" -- to the free world. They have told us much. Some of this has been published to the world. The Petrov case in Australia is a good example of this. In other cases, for security reasons, it has seemed to be wiser to hold back on publicity to help us to delve more deeply into the Communist organization and practices.

We estimate that the Soviet expenditures in training, support and operation of its over-all subversive mechanism may approach 10 percent of its expenditure on its over-all armament program. On a comparable basis, that is, assuming that we spent a comparable percentage of our defense budget for defense against these activities, we would be allocating to this work some three to four billion dollars annually. I need hardly tell you that such is not the case!

The importance of police and other internal security forces in this work has become more and more evident in many parts of the world. Our conventional military forces are normally designed to cope with open, external aggression. Where countries are subject to communist subversive tactics, the internal security forces must generally be the first line of defense. It is up to them to ferret out the agents of subversion, stop the damage before it gets out of hand, and thus maintain internal domestic peace and quiet without the necessity for calling on the military forces to deal with open revolt. In some instances, take Czechoslovakia in 1948, for example, where the police force is infiltrated or comes under ineffective leadership, the damage may be done before the armed forces have an opportunity to strike a single blow.

The need for effective police and internal security forces is particularly felt in those countries which are on or near the borders of the communist bloc. Here there is a vital need for protection against what has been called "internal invasion". As communist agents and troublemakers infiltrate into such countries and cause disorders, the governments must have security forces which can spot and arrest the leaders, and break up communist inspired riots and demonstrations. This does not call for tanks and jet aircraft; it calls for a trained and loyal police.

The various American programs for military and technical assistance to critical and underdeveloped areas can only bear fruit in a secure environment. It is for this reason that a number of countries where such aid is extended have requested that our programs should include help in building up the technical competence of local security forces to help to keep the peace internally and root out and suppress subversion. The trained police of this and other free countries where the art of maintaining order is well developed will no doubt be more and more called on to contribute their skills and manpower to help in this important phase of anti-communist activity.

While I am on the subject of Communist techniques, I might mention a somewhat recent development in their program of sowing international discord -- the Kremlin's new Trojan Horse -- but one that will look quite attractive to many countries which are under pressure to build up their military establishments.

As is well known, the Soviet emerged from World War II with a substantial stockpile of obsolescent and now fairly obsolete military equipment. This included, in addition to small arms, a good many thousands of medium and heavy tanks. Immediately following the War's end, the Soviet developed a whole new series of types of tanks and aircraft, including, in aircraft, for example, the MIG-15 fighter plane, the TU-4 (B-29 type) long-range piston bomber, and more recently the IL-28 light jet bomber.

It is now estimated that the Soviet has many thousands of these types of war equipment, some becoming obsolete, some surplus. All are likely to be replaced over the next few years. New tanks are in mass production, and new long and medium range bombers are coming off the assembly line. For example, the replacement of obsolescent MIG-15's with newer models has created a reserve of some four to six thousand MIG-15's of which a very substantial number could be off-loaded as an adjunct to a general program of causing trouble throughout the world.

Of course a good share of this equipment has already gone to Communist China and to Indochina with results which are now clearly seen. There remains ample for other parts of the world, and we now hear of advanced negotiations with several countries of the Middle East. I should not be at all surprised if we soon heard that countries in this hemisphere were being approached.

A premature start with this program was made over a year ago. You will remember that it was a ship load of obsolete arms sent by Czechoslovakia to Guatemala in the ill-famed freighter Alfhem, which aroused the Guatemalan people to a realization of the Communist plans for a takeover of that country. Once again Czechoslovakia looms up as the front for the delivery of communist arms; -- this time in the Middle East.

While this type of activity may not enter directly into your day by day work, it bears closely upon the over-all international security problem. We should keep a careful watch against the possibility that some of these surplus arms, particularly small arms, may find their way into the hands of selected unscrupulous private vendors and be used indiscriminately to foment trouble. Furthermore in certain areas of Southeast Asia there is an unholy alliance between the traffickers in arms and the opium smugglers. In such ways this surplus arms problem may eventually create police problems in the domestic areas of many countries.

Thus you in your task of law enforcement, and we who are working in the intelligence field, may find ourselves dealing with separate but related phases of a common security problem.

You, Chiefs of Police, have to deal with the domestic consequences and the outcroppings of many phases of an international movement which we, as Intelligence Officers, must make a high priority intelligence target.

World War I shook our confidence in our invulnerability to other people's wars. It took World War II and the aftermath of December 7, 1941, to persuade us that we could not safely disregard, or remain in ignorance of, hostile developments in any part of the world.

On that fateful day it was not just the garrison at Pearl Harbor but all of us who were asleep. We were then awakened to a new sort of world in which we henceforth have to live. There could be no thought of return to the pre-war complacency. In this situation it became increasingly important to know what was going on in the world outside of our boundaries. That required a sound intelligence system.

Congress established the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Act of 1947 which unified the Armed Services. There is I believe some misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the functions assigned to CIA, and I should like very briefly to clarify this point, particularly as it relates to your own work.



First of all Congress made a clear and wise distinction between the function of intelligence and that of the law enforcing agencies. It specifically provided that the Central Intelligence Agency should have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions." Hence when I need help in these fields I turn to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and on the local scene to many of you for help and assistance largely in the field of protecting the security of my own personnel and the base here in this country from which our intelligence work is conducted.

Of course intelligence has long been a function of our government even though, prior to World War II, on a scale far smaller than was customary in the case of most of the major powers of the world.

The Central Intelligence Agency was not devised by Congress primarily as a means of setting new intelligence activities into motion, although it did contemplate that the collection of intelligence should be stepped up. Rather, the new agency was conceived as an appropriate means of coordinating the intelligence activities of the government and to make their function more harmoniously and effectively toward the single end of national security. It did not supplant any existing intelligence agencies, but it was given certain duties in the intelligence field not then being carried out by others.

The United States Government receives today a vast amount of information from all parts of the world. Some of it comes as a by-product of our normal work in the field of foreign relations. Much of it comes from overt sources -- the press, radio, and foreign publications. Some of it comes through new scientific techniques. For science today plays an increasing role in the gathering of intelligence just as it does in law enforcement.

All of this information has to be studied, analyzed, and put into form for use by the policy makers. Intelligence of a counter-intelligence nature, or of direct interest to the law enforcement agencies of our government, is passed to these agencies and in particular to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

While, as I mentioned, there is a clear division of functions between the intelligence agencies and the law enforcing agencies in that the line between us is largely drawn at our frontiers, it is impossible to divide the over-all security problems at our borders. Over the past years there have been important instances where the traces of espionage against us were first picked up in distant capitals, although the operation was planned to be carried out in the continental United States. Agents trained for work here have in many cases been first spotted abroad. The follow-up here requires the closest coordination between our intelligence work abroad and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In this and in other fields I can assure you that the cooperation with the FBI is smooth and effective. It was a great pleasure for me to be present the other day when our President conferred on Mr. J. Edgar Hoover the National Security Medal, the highest award the President could accord for work in this field of national security.

In further developing the coordination of our intelligence work there is held once a week under my chairmanship, a meeting of the heads of the various intelligence agencies. This includes in addition to CIA, a representative of Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence, of the State Department intelligence, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Here we prepare together coordinated estimates embodying all available intelligence on critical foreign situations. We discuss current intelligence problems; we apportion as among the appropriate agencies various tasks for the collection of intelligence.

In this way and through appropriate standing committees which have been set up we have done everything possible to ensure that vital items of intelligence available to the government are promptly placed before the appropriate policy making officers of the government, the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other members of the Cabinet or of the National Security Council, as appropriate.

In developing our intelligence mechanism we have constantly in mind the lessons of the past. We propose to do all we can in our field to see that we do not experience another Pearl Harbor. Then there was adequate intelligence to have put us on warning of the nature and location of the danger. There was then no adequate machinery for analyzing and disseminating that intelligence in an efficient and timely manner. Now we have corrected the mechanics. Only time can tell whether we will have the wisdom to draw the right conclusions from the intelligence we may have.

Here there are two major problems. Sometimes it is not too difficult to estimate, within certain margins of error, the strength of a potential enemy. If the intelligence community only does that, however, it has not really fulfilled its task. It has a duty also to estimate, on the basis of available intelligence, the probable or the possible intentions of any foe, or at least to indicate the alternative courses of action he may take. If one looks back to intelligence failures of the past, Pearl Harbor for example, we find that the error has generally come, not in a miscalculation of enemy strength but in a miscalculation of enemy intentions. Of course the policy maker often has to take a calculated risk where hostile intentions are not clear, and this applies both in the military and the political fields.

Today, of course, not only intelligence officers but millions of men and women throughout the world are trying to form their own intelligence estimate of the real intentions of the Soviet in the light of the recent Geneva Conference. Together with them the intelligence agencies are scanning the reports and analyzing the signs and trends as well as the statements and actions of the Soviet leaders themselves.

A few days ago at a banquet for the East German Communists, Nikita Khrushchev, the head of the Soviet Communist Party, made some interesting statements. It was one of his informal and likewise revealing speeches. He remarked, as reported by the radio and press services, that if anyone believes that our smiles involve abandonment of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin (the name of Stalin was added according to the official East German broadcasts but does not appear in the Moscow reports), he deceives himself poorly. Those who wait for that, he said, must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle.

There is some debate among the experts whether the word should be shrimp or crayfish for there is an old Russian proverb that says "I will do it when the crayfish whistles on the mountain top." This, I understand, is a Russian way of saying "Never";--although I learn on good authority that in the deep reaches of the sea, as detected by modern science, the crayfish or the shrimp do make some gurgling noises.

There is no hard evidence as yet, which we as intelligence or law enforcing officers can accept, that the dangers we face from the secret underground subversive activities of communism have ceased. Let us hope it does. Let us hope that Khrushchev hears the shrill call of the shrimp.

Meanwhile in all free countries we cannot relax our vigilance in meeting the dual problem of protecting our national security from the lawless elements within and the lawless elements directed and controlled from without. In these tasks we shall need sound intelligence as to the external and internal dangers to ensure effective enforcement of law within a framework which safeguards the rights of the individual.